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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to assess welfare effects of regulating the banking sector in
Morocco along the European Union lines. The agreement between the EU and Morocco,
signed in February 1996 and came into force in March 2000, provides for the gradual
establishment of an industrial free-trade zone by 2012 and progressive liberalization of
trade in agriculture. The agreement between Morocco and the EU foresees, in addition to
that, to start negotiations for a free trade area in services. The agreement contains, however,
no binding commitments. But Morocco is expected to deepen further its relationships with
Europe within the framework of the Neighboring Policy. The relevance of the issue of
banking services’ liberalization goes beyond Morocco’s agreement with the EU. On the one
hand, Morocco’s free trade agreement with the US encompasses services, more specifically
financial services, in addition to manufactured goods, agricultural products, intellectual
property rights, and government procurement. This agreement is expected to come into
force in 2006. On the other hand, under GATS, Morocco is projected to increase its
commitments and opens up further its banking sector to foreign competition. The last
commitments made by Morocco in Uruguay Round were mainly under commercial
presence (mode 3) as compared to cross-border supply (mode 1) and consumption abroad
(mode 2). Except lending to finance investment in Morocco or commercial transactions
with Morocco allowed under the mode 1, no commitment has been made in other items
(Achy 2002). Hence, there is a real need to understand opportunities and challenges of
liberalizing banking services on the Moroccan economy.
So far, the potential impact of liberalizing trade in goods on the Moroccan economy has
received much more academic attention (Rutherford and Tarr (1997), Chater and
Hamdouch (2001), Achy and Milgram (2003) and Chater (2004)). In contrast, the potential
impact of liberalizing trade in services in general, and banking services more specifically,
has not received comparable interest. The main objective of this research is to filling this
gap in the literature. The potential impact of liberalizing banking services goes beyond the
banking sector itself since these services are cost components in other activities.
Liberalization is expected to lead to more competition, lower interest rates margins, better
quality and higher access to banking services.
2Theoretically, an efficient financial market is assumed to contribute to economic growth by
collecting more funds and allocating them to those projects with the highest returns, by
providing liquidity and reducing the need for precautionary savings, and dealing with
adverse selection, moral hazard and transaction costs issues. The link between financial
sector development and economic growth has been widely documented in the literature.
Evidence supports that the extent of financial intermediation in an economy is crucial for its
growth (Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Levine (1997), Levine & Zervos (1998)).
In Morocco, banking sector dominates financial landscape. Bank assets and loans represent
respectively, about 96 and 56 percent of GDP by the end of 2004. Banks also control about
80 percent of the leasing companies, manage 70 percent of mutual fund assets, own 10 of
the 15 securities firms, and listed bank shares account for about 30 percent of the
Casablanca stock exchange (Word Bank 2000). For these reasons, our focus is on the
banking services and the potential impact of their liberalization on the rest of the economy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The first section presents the major
developments in the banking sector in Morocco. Section two examines the Moroccan
regulations as well as institutions in charge of monitoring banking sector activity. Section
three computes the degree of restrictiveness of this sector in Morocco with respect to that of
the European Union. Section four provides a first approximation of the potential welfare
effects of harmonizing Moroccan regulations in the banking sector with those of the EU.
Finally, section five concludes.
1. Major developments in the banking sector in Morocco
a. Brief historical overview
During the pre-adjustment period (before 1983), the allocation of financial resources were
highly distorted by the government interventions. This allocation was largely driven by
non-market mechanisms such as ceiling of refinancing by the central bank, credit rationing,
mandatory holding of government securities by banks, and administratively set interest
rates. These constraints limited the scope for competition and innovative practices among
banks and leads to an excessive risk-averse banking sector. The weight of mandatory
holding (35% of banking sector assets) limited the ability of banks to manage their
resources, and prevented them from allocating sufficient resources to acquiring and
processing information on the private sector. During the pre-adjustment era, the primary
task of the banking sector was to provide cheap finance to cover government deficit, and
“priority sectors” needs through mandatory holding of government securities, and bonds
issued by the development or specialized banks.
By mid-1983 Morocco adopted a comprehensive structural adjustment program. In addition
to the financial sector reform, different reforms took place during the adjustment period
such as trade liberalization, exchange control liberalization, tax reform, and public
enterprises reform and privatization. The Moroccan banking sector experienced substantial
3steps towards market oriented system from mid eighties and particularly in the nineties.
Interest rate subsidies to priority sectors were reduced or eliminated. The monetary
authorities started to manage liquidity through a more active use of reserve requirements
and a more market-based allocation of refinancing. The share of refinancing of banks
through the central bank intervention on the money market grew from 2.6 percent in 1985
to 27.4 percent in 1994.
The process of liberalizing interest rates was gradual. Roughly, two periods can be
distinguished. During the first period, monetary authorities continued to set minimum rates
of return on deposits, and maximum rates for credits. While stimulating competition among
banks in saving collection and credit extension, these measures allowed the authorities to
prevent interest rates volatility and protect savers and borrowers from banks’ potential
abuse. During the second period, a quasi liberalization of interest rates on deposits took
place. Interest rates on credits were set on the basis of a “reference rate”. Initially, “interest
rates on government bonds” were taken as reference. Interest rates on credits to the private
sector could not exceed the reference rate by more than one third. In 1991, the weighted
average of returns on 6 months and one year deposits became the reference rate. This mode
of determination of interest rates allowed overcoming the weaknesses of the former mode.
The maximum rate on credits amounted to 15.6 percent in 1992 and 15.8 percent in 1993.
These high levels can be justified neither by inflation rates, nor by the cost of the banking
resources. A new reference rate, “the banking basis rate”, took place in April 1994. This
rate is based on the average cost of all banking deposits. The maximum rate should not
exceed by more than three points the reference rate for credits extended for less than seven
years, and four points for more than seven years. The maximum rates ranged between 12
and 13 percent.
Regarding the monetary policy, the government priority was to reduce inflation and
external deficit by controlling monetary aggregates. M2 was set as an intermediate target
and monetary authorities succeeded to a large extent to keep money supply under control
except in 1990 and 1991 due to the effect of abolishing credit ceiling system implemented
in 1990. Monetary authorities increased their use of indirect instruments to manage money
supply. The central bank intervention to provide banking sector with liquidity relied on
auctions and advances on the money market, open market operations, and the minimum
reserve requirements. Since 1995, the control of money supply is done through the interest
rate on the money market.
During the adjustment era, the banking sector started to play more effectively its role in
providing funds for private agents. Credits to the private sector experienced higher growth
rate compared to those allocated to the government sector. The share of private credits in
GDP increased from 31.5 percent in 1983 to 41.9 percent in 1992. At the same, banks
began to allocate more funds to medium and long term credits. Their share in total credits
doubled over the adjustment decade rising from 11.2 percent in 1983 to 22.7 percent in
1992.
4A new banking law was adopted in 1993. This legal framework unified the banking system
and abolished sectoral specialization. Prudential regulation in line with international
standards was implemented and was extended to other credit institutions such as leasing
and consumer finance companies. The Stock market legislation was updated in 1993. The
Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE) was privatized and its management was transferred to
the association of brokerage house.
The Central Bank has been gradually acquiring its independence from the executive
authority, and the monetary policy has been more driven by liquidity conditions than by the
government’s requirement to finance its fiscal deficit. Moreover, the government has been
meeting its financial needs through the market. An ambitious program of public debt
management has taken place, and seems to have already produced a sensitive effect on the
cost of the public debt by substantially reducing its burden on the economy.
Morocco reformed its foreign exchange system in the late 1980s and early 1990s by,
gradually, unifying and liberalizing foreign exchange markets. It has established current
account convertibility since 1993, but still imposes restrictions on capital account
movements and most of these restrictions are imposed on outflows. Only non residents are
permitted to hold accounts in foreign currencies.
b. Recent developments
The Moroccan banking sector is made of the Central Bank (Bank Al Maghrib) and
seventeen banks after the Banque Commerciale du Maroc (BCM) took over Wafabank,
which leads to the creation of the largest private bank in Morocco, Attijariwafa Bank; and
the absorption of BNDE by CNCA1. The State’s presence in the banking sector, although
has relatively decreased, remains important. Some estimates indicate that public banks
control 46 percent of banking sector assets in 2001 (Commission of the European
Communities 2004). Foreign capital is gradually representing a significant share of the
Moroccan banks' equity. A number of international banks have increased their ownership in
the major Moroccan banks. French banks became the main shareholder in a number of
Moroccan banks: 53 percent of BMCI is owned by Banque Nationale de Paris, BNP
Paribas, 51 percent of Crédit du Maroc is controlled by Crédit Lyonnais, and 52 percent of
SGMB belongs to Société générale of France. In addition, there are two direct foreign
subsidiaries: Citibank, owned by the US Citibank, and Arab Bank Morocco, which is
controlled by the Jordanian Group. Foreign capital is also present in private-Moroccan
owned banks such as Attijariwafa Bank and BMCE.
Banking sector concentration increased tremendously over the last few years. The three
largest banks own 63.7 percent of the banking sector cumulated net wealth in 2004
compared to 52.8 percent in 2003 and 46.8 percent in 2000. In the meantime, the share of
the nine smallest banks does net exceed 5 percent of the banking sector cumulated net
1 BNDE (Banque Nationale de Development Economique) and CNCA (Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole)
are both public banks and former specialized banks.
5wealth in 2004 compared to roughly 7 percent in 2000. The high degree of concentration in
the banking sector, and banking dominance over the other compartments of financial
services are often seen as signal of limited market opportunities (Oxford Business Group
2004).
The branch banking network has developed rapidly over the last years as the number of
branches rose from 976 in 1990 to 1 356 at the end of 1998 and 2043 by the end of 2004.
However, most branches are located in urban areas more specifically in the largest cities.
Overall, the density of the banking network in Morocco remains low, with nearly 15,000
inhabitants per branch by the end of 2004. Moreover, estimates indicate that less than 20
percent of the Moroccan population have bank accounts, and a large share of small and
medium enterprises continue to rank "access to finance" as one of the most important
difficulties they suffer from in their business (ICA2 survey 2004). The under banking
situation of the Moroccan economy suggest also the existence of substantial room for
banking services demand in the coming years. The international experience shows that
further liberalization of banking services increases competition and pushes banks as well as
other financial institutions to explore new segments of the market. Hence, liberalization is
expected to generate a price effect by pushing down interest rates and reducing margins; but
also a quantity effect through higher market coverage.
Table 1 presents the balance sheet of the banking sector in Morocco from 1997 to 2004. On
the asset side, banks allocate roughly 60 percent of their balance sheets to lending to
customers and invest around 20 percent in the government fixed-income securities (treasury
bills). Regarding the liability side, the table shows that almost three quarter of banking
resources comes from deposit and saving accounts. Deposit accounts are not remunerated
which reduces the cost of funds for banks and increases their margins. Moreover, the share
of unremunerated deposits represented less than 33 percent in 1997 and attained almost 44
percent in 2004. Finally, provisions for bad loans represent 8 percent in 2004 compared to
5.2 percent in 1997.
Insert table 1 about here
The banking system has a relatively adequate capital base. On the basis of the data provided
by the central bank, the capital adequacy ratio of the banking system at end-June 2004 was
10.2 percent, higher than the minimum capital adequacy of 8 percent set by prudential
regulation. However, this comfortable average dissimulates large variations among banks.
In particular, former specialized public banks are well below the prudential threshold
despite that some of them have already benefited from recapitalization operations in 2000-
2001 (IMF 2003). State-owned specialized banks continue to operate in exemption of key
prudential rules, and their risk is only contained by the government support. Clearly, it does
2 ICA. : Investment Climate Assessment.
6seem from the precarious situation of state-owned specialized banks that they are prepared
to face liberalization challenges.
Insert table 2 about here
The level of non-performing loans (NPLs), in the banking system is relatively high but
unevenly distributed among banks. It amounts to 19.4 percent of bank loans at the end of
2004 compared to 12.6 percent at the end of 1998. This is mainly due to the former
specialized public banks (CIH, BNDE, CNCA)3 for which the share of NPLs stands at 36.4
percent in 2002 (IMF 2003). The recent increase of their share reflects the tightening of the
classification rules, which banks were required to comply with. In fact, the average age of
non-performing loans is estimated to more than five years.
Insert table 3 about here
Available data on the composition of NPLs indicate that much of credit risk borne by banks
is due to large customers, rather than small and medium-sized businesses. According to the
World Bank (2000), loans larger than DH 500,000 accounted for 90 percent of the total of
NPLs in arrears in 1998. Nearly 60 percent of their total value is accounted for by 394 loans
larger than DH 10 million. On the sectoral front, a high concentration of non-performing
loans is found in textiles, garment and leather, in commercial activities and in the
construction sector (Bank Al Maghrib report 2004). There are two issues that need to be
addressed to overcome the problem of bad loans in the future. First, a significant effort has
to be done to improve "credit scoring system" of individuals as well as corporate sector in
Morocco. Second, the capacity of legal and judiciary system in recovering loans needs to be
strengthened. In particular, legal provisions on bankruptcy and creditors' rights have to be
reformed.
Payments in Morocco are predominantly settled in cash. However, the use of non-cash
instruments has made a dramatic progress over the last years. Various indicators confirm
this trend. The number of bankcards increased by more than 20 percent in 2004 and stood
at 2.2 millions. The number of ATM machines, which did not exceed 1071 units in 2002,
reached 1839 units by the end of 2004. The total amount settled by cards increased by 41%
in 2004.
Clearance and settlement operations are being modernized in order to reduce settlement
lags for inter-cities transactions and meet international standards. Two major projects have
3 CIH: Crédit Immobilier et Hôtelier, BNDE: Banque Nationale de Développement Économique, CNCA : Caisse Nationale de Crédit
Agricole.
7been implemented over the last few years. The first is the Moroccan Interbank Teleclearing
System (SIMT4), which started in Casablanca in May 2002, extended to other large cities in
2003 and, in principle, has been generalized to all other parts of the national territory since
September 2004. In spite of that, clearance of checks between different cities continues to
take time and can last as much as one week. The second project is the interbank electronic
banking center (CMI5), which has been effective since February 2004.
Regarding profitability, there are wide differences between commercial and state owned
specialized banks as shown in table 4. Average return on assets in the banking sector
declined from 1 percent in 1997 to 0.7 percent in 2002. This downward trend is entirely
attributed to a significant deterioration of profitability in specialized banks with an average
ROA of (-1) percent in 2002. Moroccan banks are achieving relatively high levels of ROE
although they are declining. In 1997, average ROE stood at 11 percent compared to 7.8
percent by the end of 2002. But while profitability is very comfortable in commercial
banks, its level in specialized banks is very worrying and might threaten the overall
stability of the banking sector.
Insert table 4 about here
Banking spread, defined as the interest rate charged by banks on loans to customers minus
the interest rate paid on deposits, is on a downward trend since mid 1990s. However, its
level continues to be relatively high by international standards. In 2002, the average spread
recorded is 4.8 percent. This is particularly high given that more than one 40 percent of
bank resources are obtained for free. Various factors can explain this situation such as
insufficient competition among banks, high reserve requirements by the central Bank (16.5 percent
of deposits), and high proportion of non performing loans. A stronger competition is expected to
lead banks to further decrease their lending rates, and offer better opportunities for
customers’ deposits. International experience shows that such an amount of free resources
cannot be sustained in the long term as the financial system deepens, and a broader variety
of competing financial assets becomes available (IMF 2003).
As far as exchange rate risk is concerned, prudential regulations limit open positions to 10
percent of capital any one currency, and to 20 percent for all currencies combined. Current
positions are far below these limits (between 2 and 3 percent) and don’t expose the
Moroccan banks to exchange risk.
2. Regulatory framework analysis
The banking sector in Morocco is governed by the banking law of July 1993, which
replaced the Royal Decree of April 1967 enacting the law concerning the banking
4 SIMT stands for "Système interbancaire marocain de télécompensation".
5 CMI stands for : "Centre monétique interbancaire".
8profession and credit. The 1993’s law has unified between commercial banks and
specialized financial institutions (specialized banks) and created a unified body of legal
provisions applicable to all credit institutions. This law has also extended the powers of the
monetary authorities and created new bodies for dialogue with the profession and economic
agents.
Under the terms of the 1993 banking law, the concept of credit institution encompasses
banks and financing companies. Banks are institutions with a universal function, while
financing companies engage only in the activities for which they have been approved
(consumer credit, leasing, real estate credit, factoring, provision of warrants, or
management of means of payment). In addition, only banks are permitted to collect demand
deposits or deposits at up to two years.
2.1. Supervisory and advisory bodies
The supervisory authorities (monetary authorities) in Morocco consist of the Minister of
Finance and the Governor of Bank Al-Maghrib.
The Minister of Finance has important decision-making powers with regard to regulation
of the activity of banks and to monetary policy. He is authorized to issue the approval to
exercise the profession of banking and to fix the minimum amount of the capital or
endowment of banks, after the Credit Institutions Committee has expressed its opinion. It
can also establish the conditions and procedures for the granting of credits, as well as the
minimum or maximum prudential ratios which have to be respected. The Minister of
Finance, on the proposal of the Governor of Bank Al-Maghrib and based on the opinion of
of the Disciplinary Commission, may also impose penalties, which can go as far as
withdrawal of the license to exercise.
The Governor of Bank Al-Maghrib is in charge of the implementing procedures of the
banking law provisions. He is also in charge of surveillance of the activity of banks through
conducting on-the-site and documentary verifications. The Bank Al-Maghrib is also in
charge of managing a Risk Centralization Service and Payment Incidents Centralization
Service. It can create or manages any other common-interest service at the request of banks'
representatives.
The Moroccan banking law has created two advisory bodies: the National Money and
Saving Council (CNME6) and the Credit Institution committee (CEC7).
The CNME is consulted by the monetary authorities on all issues relating to monetary and
credit policies and the means of their implementation. It provides its opinion on the general
conditions of operation of credit institutions and may make proposals or suggestions within
the field of its competence. The CNME can create internal working groups to carry out
6 CNME stands for «Conseil National de la monnaie et de l'Epargne ».
7 CEC stands for : « Comité des Etablissement de Crédit »
9studies which it considers useful for appropriately accomplishing it duties. The CNME is
chaired by the Minister of Finance or, in case he is unable to attend, by the Governor of
Bank Al-Maghrib, the Vice-Chairman, and includes 29 permanent members representing,
in particular, the public authorities, the economic operators and members of the Moroccan
Professional Group of Banks -(Banks' representatives). The CNME meets at least twice a
year, and has its quorum when at least half of its members are present. Its recommendations
and proposals are adopted by the majority of the members present. The secretariat of the
CNME is performed by Bank Al-Maghrib.
The Credit Institutions Committee (CEC) has to be consulted before any decision
concerning the activity of credit institutions is taken, or on the technical aspects of
monetary policy and prudential rules. The CEC provides its opinion on various issues
concerning the activity of credit institutions, especially as regards: the granting, renewal or
withdrawal of approval to exercise banking activity, the conditions for the acquisition of
participating interests n the capital of enterprises, the conditions for the publication of
annual and half-yearly accounts, the setting up of subsidiaries, the opening of branches and
agencies abroad. The CEC is also consulted on matters relating to the terms and conditions
of operation of the deposit protection scheme (collective deposit guarantee fund8). The
CEC is chaired by the Governor of the Bank Al-Maghrib and includes as other members:
the Vice-Governor of the Central Bank as vice-chairman, two representatives of the
Minister of Finance, two representatives of the Moroccan Professional Group of Banks
(GPBM), and two representatives of the Professional Association of Financing Companies
(APSF). The secretariat of the CNME is performed by Bank Al-Maghrib. The committee
has a quorum when at least half of its members are present and adopts its recommendations
and proposals by a majority of the members present.
The 1993' banking law has also created a third advisory body in charge of disciplinary
matters, the Credit Institutions Disciplinary Commission (Commission de Discipline des
Etablissements de Crédit). The CEC is assigned the duty of drawing up the disciplinary
matters and proposing penalties which can be imposed on credit institutions by the
monetary authorities. Among penalties that can be suggested: prohibition or restriction of
the exercise of certain operations, the appointment of a temporary director and the
withdrawal of the approval to exercise. The CEC is chaired by the Vice-Governor of the
Central Bank or his representative, and comprises a representative of Bank Al-Maghrib,
two representatives of the Minister of Finance, and one magistrate appointed by the
Minister of Finance on the proposal of the Minister of Justice. The commission's opinions
are adopted by a majority of the members present.
2.2. Entry conditions in the banking sector
Any legal person, before exercising the activity of credit institution, must send his
application to the Minister of Finance for approval as a bank or financing company. In
support of his application it submits a dossier consisting of information on technical,
8 The deposit protection scheme is known as « Fond Collectif de Garantie des Dépôts ».
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financial and human resources (quality of founders, shareholders and managers), and on its
short-term and medium term plan of action (opening of branches and agencies). Approval is
granted or refused after consultative advice has been provided by the Credit Institutions
Committee, which is in charge of examining the dossier and is consequently authorized to
request all documents and information which it deems necessary.
A credit institution may be created only in the form of a fixed-capital limited liability
company, except for institutions on which the law has conferred a special status and those
whose registered head office is located abroad.
Application for a new approval is required whenever changes affect the nationality of a
credit institution, its control, the location of its registered head office or the nature of the
operations which it habitually carries out. Approval is also required before merging of two
or more credit institutions or the absorption of one or more institutions by another. The
setting up of subsidiaries or the opening of branches, agencies and offices abroad by
institutions which have their registered head office in Morocco are subject to prior approval
by the Minister of Finance, given after the Credit Institutions Committee has given its
approbation.
2.3. Prudential regulation in the banking sector in Morocco
The banking sector’s prudential framework has been significantly improved in recent years.
However, additional measures need to be implemented by the central bank to be in
accordance with the Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. Credit
institutions are required to comply with the prudential rules, the accounting standards, and
information disclosure to the monetary authorities.
Prudential rules relate to capital requirement, minimum liquidity and solvency ratios,
maximum concentration of risk ratio, and limits to open positions in foreign currencies.
Other prudential rules deal with classification of nonperforming loans and their
provisioning requirements.
The minimum capital was raised from 15 million DH in 1983 to 100 million DH in 1991.
The liquidity ratio, which represents the ratio of cash and short term assets to short term
liabilities, should be kept at a minimum of 100 percent as allow banks to be able to meet
their short term liabilities. The computation of the solvency ratio has been changed to
account for the nature of risks incurred by banks. The solvency ratio is defined as the ratio
of banks’ net capital and reserves to their assets and their disbursement liabilities or
liabilities by signature (off-balance sheet). The risks are weighted by proportions 0, 20, 50
and 100 percent depending on the nature operations, the quality of lenders, and the
importance collateral. The minimum solvency ratio that has to be observed is 8 percent.
The objective of concentration of risk ratio is to limit excessive exposure to a limited
number of clients. The ratio requires that the maximum lending exposure to a single client
cannot exceed 20 percent.
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Regarding nonperforming loans, banks are required to categorize them into three categories
(potentially doubtful, doubtful and lost). Provisioning rules are designed to safeguard banks
against risk of default of their customers. Provisions are equal to 20, 50 or 100 percent
depending on their respective category.
3. Assessment of barriers to trade in the banking sector in Morocco
Measurement of barriers to trade in services is not as simple as in the case of trade in
goods. The issue of quantifying restrictions to trade in services and the economic effects of
their removal has received a special interest from academic researchers over the last few
years. But, measurement of trade in services appears to be also very crucial to policy
makers in their bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations.
For the specific case of Morocco, the potential impact of liberalizing trade in goods has
received much more academic attention (Rutherford and Tarr (1997), Chater and
Hamdouch (2001), Achy and Milgram (2003) and Chater (2004)). In contrast, the potential
impact of liberalizing trade in services in general, and banking services more specifically,
has not received comparable interest. The main objective of this research is to provide a
first assessment on this potential impact. The basic assumption that lies behind this exercise
is that by removing barriers to trade, liberalization will increase competition in the domestic
market, and lower interest rates margins. Since banking services are inputs for other
activities, any reduction of their cost will improve competitiveness and generate welfare
effects.
3.1 Methodology of computing the restrictiveness index
Various methodologies have been used to quantify barriers to trade in services. One the
most widely used is based on "frequency measures" developed by Hoeckman (1995). This
methodology has been applied to GATS commitments scheduled by member countries. A
more elaborate set of frequency measures has been constructed by the Australia's
productivity commission and applied to various services such as banking,
telecommunications, maritime transport, education, distribution and professional services.
The Australian methodology is based on the actual impediments to trade rather than
scheduled commitments under GATS. These restrictions are assigned scores and grouped
into categories, each of which has its specific numerical weight. These scores and weights
are chosen as to reflect the costs of the existing restrictions on the economic efficiency.
Based on these scores and weights, an aggregate restrictiveness index is computed for each
service in each country.
In assessing restrictiveness of trade in banking services and their economic impact, this
paper follows a methodology similar to that of the Australian team. It has been developed
by McGuire and Scheuele (2000) Kalirajan et al. (2000) and revisited by Kimura et al.
(2003). This methodology is made up of three steps.
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§ In the first step, restrictions are listed and weights are assigned to them. These
weights are determined based on how significantly a given restriction would
limit service suppliers from entering and/or operating in the domestic market.
§ In the second step, based on surveys and interviews, scoring sheets are filled
out. The assigned scores vary from 0 (least restrictive case) to 1 (most restrictive
case). For each item, the restrictiveness index (partial restrictiveness index) is
obtained by multiplying the assigned score by its corresponding weight. The
overall restrictiveness index is calculated by summing up all partial indexes.
§ Finally, in the third step, ad valorem equivalents of barriers are estimated on the
basis of the overall restrictiveness index.
As shown below, restrictions are classified into three categories:
(1) Restrictions on commercial presence,
(2) Restrictions on cross-border trade,
(3) Other restrictions.
The score is chosen for each category of restrictions depending on the nature of its legal
and regulatory provisions complemented by field interviews conducted with experts in the
banking sector in Morocco. Legal and regulatory provisions, are not strictly enforced in
some cases, and hence don't offer an accurate reference for measuring the extent of
restrictions. On the other hand, a new banking law and a new legal status of the central
bank are being adopted. Their implementation in the near future is expected to narrow the
gap between the legal and regulatory frameworks in Morocco and their international
counterparts. Therefore, the assessment of restrictions to the banking services in Morocco is
based on a combination of objective and subjective evaluations.
On the basis of our computation, the overall restrictiveness index for the Moroccan banking
services is 0.35.
McGuire and Scheuele (2000) have computed trade restrictiveness indexes for 27 countries
(19 developed and 8 developing countries). Their results are very useful for comparative
purposes. The indexes for developed countries are less than 0.1 (for instance US: (0.06);
UK: (0.07); Switzerland (0.08); Italy: (0.07)) except Australia (0.12) and Japan (0.19).
Conversely, the indexes are substantially higher in developing economies (for instance
Malaysia (0.65); Indonesia (0.55); Korea (0.43), Chile (0.40) and Columbia (0.23)).
Argentina is an exception with an index of (0.07) similar to that of developed countries.
The degree of restrictiveness to trade in banking services in Morocco, which takes the value
0.35, seems to be located in the middle among developing countries but significantly high
when compared to that of industrialized economies.
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In comparison to other countries in the region, the restrictiveness index in Morocco seems
to be significantly higher than those of Egypt and the Turkey (Kheir-El-Din et al. 2005) and
(Berument and Togan 2005) respectively and lower than the Tunisian index (Boughzala et
al. 2005). Overall, these results are somewhat expected. The main explanation of these
findings is that Egypt and Turkey have their capital accounts liberalized, while both
Maghreb Arab countries continue to impose significant restrictions on foreign exchange
and on the ability of residents to hold foreign currency accounts.
3.2. Tariff equivalent of banking services' barriers to trade in Morocco
Theoretically, the presence of impediments to free trade of banking services affect access,
quality and price of these services. In a more liberalized environment, banking services
would be accessible to a wider range of customers; they would be of a better quality, and
cheaper than under restrictions. The focus of this paper is on price-based measure of the
impact of liberalizing banking services. The two other components are important,
particularly when access to banking services is still limited (less than 20 percent of the
population has access to banking services in Morocco) and the quality of their delivery
could be substantially improved. However, access and quality components need more
subtle approach to assess their potential impact, and hence left to future research.
The price-based approach derives estimates of barriers to trade from the difference between
domestic and foreign prices. It is assumed that the existence of barriers to trade acts as an
ad valorem tax on foreign service providers. If data on prices are available, such measure
can be directly computed by comparing domestic price of the imported service with a
reference foreign price. The percentage difference between the domestic and foreign prices
is similar to a tariff. In our case, this would mean to compare the price of banking services
in Morocco to that of the EU, and derive the magnitude of tariff equivalent due to barriers
to trade. The implementation of this approach poses two issues. The first relates to the
availability of suitable and accurate data on banking services prices. The second issue arises
from the fact that the entire gap between domestic and foreign prices is supposed to
originate from restrictions to trade. In practice, other factors, other that restrictions to trade,
may justify the existence of price differences between domestic and foreign financial
services’ providers. To overcome these weaknesses, an alternative approach has been
applied.
This alternative approach is based on Kalirajan et al. (2000) who combine restrictiveness
indexes with other data to estimate econometrically the impact of barriers. Using data on
the economic determinants of banking services prices, an econometric model has been
formulated and estimated by Kalirajan et al. (2000). The estimated coefficient of the
restrictiveness index variable, included as additional explanatory in the econometric model,
provides an approximation of the effect of trade restrictions on prices, controlling for other
relevant determinants included in the model.
By doing so, Kalirajan et al. (2000) quantified the impact of restrictions in banking services
on the net interest margin of banks, which measures the price of banking services. The net
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interest margin (NIM) is defined as the difference between the interest rate banks charge on
their loans and the rate they pay on their deposits. Restrictions on trade in banking services,
by constraining the scope for competition, are expected to increase the interest margin or
the price of banking services.
Under the assumption that the expected effects of restrictions to trade in banking services
are common across countries, the same estimated coefficient found be Kalirajan et al.
(2000) has been extended Morocco, and applied to its restrictiveness index. The tariff
equivalent of restrictions is then calculated from the formula
)1(*100*100 *
0
01 -=ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é - TRIbe
NIM
NIMNIM
NIM1: stands for the net interest margin under restrictions and NIM0 the net interest margin
under free trade, TRI the value of trade restrictiveness index, and b is he estimated
coefficient associated to the restrictiveness index variable. According to Kalirajan et al.
(2000) estimates, b takes the value 0.732.
By applying the above formula to our restrictiveness index (0.35), the result shows that the
existing barriers to trade in the banking sector in Morocco are equivalent to imposing a
tariff of roughly 30 percent on net interest margins. In other words, the lack of foreign
competition in the domestic market increases the cost of funding for economic actors by 30
percent compared to what would prevail under full liberalization. Protecting local banks
and imposing restrictions to prevent their exposure to international competition generates
an excess of 30 percent in the cost of banking services. This higher cost of finance weakens
local producers’ competitiveness, particularly those that rely on banking services for their
funding.
In Kalirajan et al. (2000), the restrictiveness index for the banking services in the EU is
estimated to 0.0708. Applying the same formula leads to a tariff equivalent of 6.3 percent in
comparison with a scenario of full liberalization. Harmonizing the Moroccan banking
sector regulations along the EU lines, would translate into a reduction of 19.3 percent of the
cost of banking services. However, it has to be noticed that the EU restrictiveness index
was computed by Kalirajan et al. (2000) on the basis of 1997’s regulations. It is very likely
that the EU has further liberalized its banking services over the period 1998-2005.
Therefore, the magnitude of our tariff equivalent with respect to the EU estimated to 19.3
percent is probably only a lower band estimate. An attempt is made in next section to
provide a first assessment of expected welfare effects using an input-output methodology.
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4. Welfare effects of liberalizing banking services in Morocco
The purpose of this paper is not just to measure the magnitude of barriers to trade in the
banking services, but also to provide an approximation of the impact of these barriers on
the rest of the economy. The same exercise has already been done in the area of removing
barriers on goods using econometric, as well as partial and general equilibrium
methodologies. The objective arises from the need to understand how the removal of
barriers to trade in services will affect conditions of competition, productivity, allocation of
resources, and economic welfare within and between sectors and countries (Deardorff and
Stern 2004).
In our specific case, banking services are intermediate inputs used by various activities in
the production of other commodities. Hence, it is expected that prices of other commodities
in the economy will change as a result of removing impediments to trade in banking
services.
In order to assess the effect a 19.3 percent decrease in the price of banking services on the
economy computed earlier, the 1998 Input-Output table of the Moroccan economy has
been used9. We assume that there are no significant changes in the structure of the
Moroccan economy over the period 1998-2005. We suppose in particular that the banking
sector plays more or less the same role in 2005 compared to 1998. This assumption is to
some extent defendable. Although, the share of the banking sector's total assets increased
from 80 to 96 percent of GDP from 1998 to 2004, and the share of total deposits rose from
56 to 71 percent of GDP over the same period; the share of private claim in GDP increased
only from 49 to 55 percent. Furthermore, a large part of this increase is due to real estate
and consumption credit extended to households.
The methodology of assessing welfare effects of liberalizing trade, applied in this paper, is
made of several steps. First, Let A be the 36x36 matrix of input coefficients. On the basis of
A; the matrix B is created form the 35x35 input-output matrix by deleting the 30th column
and 30th raw referring to the banking sector. Denote the 30th raw where the 30th column
element has been deleted by e. Let p be the 1x35 price vector of the 35 commodities
excluding banking sector and v.a the corresponding 1x35 unit gross value added vector.
The price equation can be written as:
p = p B + pb e + v.a
pb denotes the price of the banking services. By rearranging the above equation, we obtain:
p = pb e (I-B)-1 + v.a (I-B)-1
9 This is the most recent input-output table available in Morocco.
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Given the price of banking services that will prevail in Morocco when it adopts and
implements the EU rules and regulations, pb, we determine the equilibrium prices of the
other 35 remaining commodities from the above equation assuming that there is no change
in the unit gross value added vector v.a.
We denote by p the 1x36 price vector composed by the price vector p and the scalar pb.
p = (p pb), and CON the 36x1 consumption expenditure vector obtained from the 1998
input-output matrix by deleting the value of consumption of banking sector and conb the
value of consumption of banking services. Then we form the 36x1 consumption vector as
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
=
bcon
CON
CONS .
By construction, all base year prices are equal to unity. Hence, total consumption
expenditure evaluated at base-year prices can be written as:
C = u CONS
where u denotes the 1x36 unit vector. The value of total consumption expenditure
evaluated at the prices that will prevail once Morocco has adopted and implemented the EU
rules and regulations in the banking sector is then given by:
C* = p CONS
The effect on consumer welfare can be calculated as:
(C - C*) x 100 / C*10
As indicated earlier, this measure of welfare effect change focuses exclusively on the price
effect of liberalization. It does not account for any potential increase in consumer demands
for the different commodities following their price reduction. Hence, this approach
provides a downward biased estimate of the welfare effect. Accounting for the other effects
would require the use of price elasticities of demand for the 36 commodities included in the
input-output table, which are nor readily available. Thus, the welfare gain is very likely to
be higher that estimates provided in this paper.
On the basis of previous computations, the adoption of the EU rules and regulations in the
banking sector is expected to lead to a reduction of banking services’ price 19.3 percent.
Accordingly, the welfare of the society captured through total consumption, will improve
by 1.151 percent. Since in 1998 consumption represented 86.12 percent of GDP11, this
welfare gain will translate into an increase of 0.9912 percent in GDP.
10 Note that this approach determines the equivalent variation in consumer' income.
11 Haut Commissariat au Plan (2003), « Comptes et Agrégats de la nation 1980-2002 »
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Since in 2004, GDP amounted to DH 444 billion or the equivalent of US$ 50 billion, our
first approximation of the welfare gain from adopting the EU rules and regulations in the
banking sector is estimated to US$ 495 million. It very likely that this figure underestimate
the total effect of liberalizing banking services in Morocco.
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to assess welfare effects of regulating the banking sector in
Morocco along the European Union lines. The issue of quantifying restrictions to trade in
services and the economic effects of their removal has received a special interest from
academic researchers over the last few years. But, measurement of trade in services appears
to be also very crucial to policy makers in their bilateral, regional or multilateral
negotiations.
As far as Morocco is concerned, the potential impact of liberalizing trade in goods has
received much more academic attention. In contrast, the potential impact of liberalizing
trade in services in general, and banking services more specifically, has not received
comparable interest. The main objective of this research is to filling this gap in the
literature.
Theoretically, the presence of impediments to free trade of banking services affect access,
quality and price of these services. In a more liberalized environment, banking services
would be accessible to a wider range of customers; they would be of a better quality, and
cheaper than under restrictions. The focus of this paper is on price-based measure of the
impact of liberalizing banking services. The two other components are important
particularly when access to banking services is still limited (less than 20 percent of the
population has access to banking services in Morocco) and the quality of their delivery
could be substantially improved. However, access and quality components need more
subtle approach to assess their potential impact, and hence left to future research.
This paper follows a methodology similar to that of the Australian team. It has been
developed by McGuire and Scheuele (2000) Kalirajan et al. (2000) and revisited by Kimura
et al. (2003). According to our computation, the overall restrictiveness index for Moroccan
banking services is 0.35. McGuire and Scheuele (2000) have computed trade restrictiveness
indexes for 27 countries (19 developed and 8 developing countries). Their results are very
useful for comparative purposes. The degree of restrictiveness of trade in the banking
services in Morocco seems to be located in the middle among developing countries but
significantly high when compared to that of industrialized economies. In comparison to
other countries in the region, the restrictiveness index in Morocco seems to be significantly
higher than those of Egypt and the Turkey and respectively and lower than the Tunisian
index.
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Under the assumption that the expected effects of restrictions to trade in banking services
are common across countries, the same estimated coefficient found by Kalirajan et al.
(2000) has been extended Morocco, and applied to its restrictiveness index to compute the
tariff equivalent of restrictions. The result shows that the existing barriers to trade in the
banking sector in Morocco are equivalent to imposing a tariff of roughly 30 percent.
In Kalirajan et al. (2000), the restrictiveness index for the EU is estimated to 0.0708, which
leads to a tariff equivalent of 6.3 percent in comparison with a scenario of full
liberalization. Hence, harmonizing the Moroccan banking sector regulations along the EU
lines, would translate into a reduction of 19.3 percent of the cost of banking services.
In order to assess the effect this reduction on the economy, the 1998 Input-Output table of
the Moroccan economy has been used assuming that there are no significant changes in the
structure of the Moroccan economy over the period 1998-2005. Our results indicate that the
welfare, captured through total consumption, will improve by 1.151 percent. Since in 1998
consumption represented 86.12 percent of GDP12, this welfare gain will translate into an
increase of 0.9912 percent in GDP.
In absolute terms, our first approximation of the welfare gain from adopting the EU rules
and regulations in the banking sector in Morocco is estimated to US$ 495 million.
However, this figure may be underestimating the total effect of liberalizing banking
services. In particular, it is expected that dynamic and efficiency effects will be much
substantial.
12 Haut Commissariat au Plan (2003), « Comptes et Agrégats de la nation 1980-2002 »
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Table 1
Structure of the Moroccan Banking Sector's Balance Sheet
1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Assets
Treasury and financial intermediaries 10.3 12.1 10.9 11.5 13.2 15.2
Treasury bonds (BDT) 23.3 19.2 20.6 20.5 19.2 16.9
Loans to customers 60.2 62.0 59.0 58.3 58.2 58.3
Securities and shares 5.4 6.0 6.5 6.7 6.5 6.6
Fixed assets 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Liabilities
Deposit accounts 32.7 35.2 37.9 40.2 41.9 43.8
Saving accounts 35.0 34.3 33.1 32.2 31.9 31.2
Provision for bad loans 5.2 5.4 6.3 6.7 7.4 7.9
Own funds 9.4 9.2 9.3 8.9 8.2 8.0
Other liabilities 17.7 15.9 13.4 12.0 10.7 9.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total balance sheet (billion DH) 251 321 351 368 397 424
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Table 2
Capital adequacy of the Banking Sector in Morocco
1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2004
Statutory capital as a proportion of risk weighted assets 11.2 12.6 12.8 12.6 12.5 10.8
Commercial banks 12.7 13.1 14.7 15.3 15.3
Specialized banks 6.1 11.1 5.9 1.2 0.5
Table 3
Non performing loans in the banking system in Morocco
1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Non performing loans in billions of DH 16.6 21.1 35.8 35.7 38.0 43.2 48.1
NPLs as a share of banking credits in % 11.0 12.6 17.5 17.2 17.7 18.7 19.4
Provisions as a share of NPLs in % 57.5 52.6 45.7 53.0 53.8 55.0 59.3
NPLs as a share of banking assets in % 6.8 7.7 11.2 10.3 10.3 10.8 11.3
NPLs as a share of GDP in % 5.2 6.1 10.1 9.3 9.5 10.3 10.8
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Table 4
Profitability indicators of the banking sector in Morocco
1997 1998 2000 2001 2002
Average return on assets (ROA) 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7
Commercial banks 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Specialized banks 0.2 -0.1 -1.0 -0.1 -1.0
Average return on equity (ROE) 11.0 9.5 8.1 10.2 7.8
Commercial banks 13.4 12.4 13.0 12.7 11.8
Specialized banks 2.8 -1.8 -14.8 -0.9 -10.0
Interest margins (as % of gross revenues) 77.2 75.0 80.0 77.8 -
Average spread between loan and deposit rates 6.27 5.54 5.10 4.81 4.81
Demand accounts (as % of bank resources) 32.7 35.2 37.9 40.2
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Appendix 1 (1/2)
List of potential restrictions to free trade of banking services and their respective weights (1)
1. Restrictions on Commercial Presence (weight w(1)=0,62)
1.1. Licensing of banks (w(1.1)=0,10)
§ Issues no new license. / No new license is allowed.
§ Issues up to 3 new licenses with only prudential requirements. / Licenses are issued through complicated
(discriminatory) and costly procedure.
§ Issues up to 6 new licenses with only prudential requirements. / Licenses are generally issued with application fee and
several requirements.
§ Issues up to 10 new licenses with only prudential requirements. / Licenses are generally issued with application fee.
§ Issues new licenses with only prudential requirements / Licenses are automatically issued upon application without any
cost.
1.2. Form of commercial presence (w(1.2)=0,10)
§ Measures which restrict or require a specific type of establishments.
§ No restriction on establishment.
1.3. Direct investment: equity participation permitted (w(1.3)=0,20)
§ The score is inversely proportional to the maximum equity participation permitted in an existing domestic bank.
1.4. Direct investment: restrictions on certain types of services (w(1.4)=0,10)
§ Restrictions on providing some types of banking services.
§ No restriction on providing any type of banking services.
1.5. Joint venture arrangements (w(1.5)=0,10)
§ Issues no new banking licenses and no entry is allowed through a joint venture with a domestic bank.
§ Bank entry is only through a joint venture with a domestic bank.
§ No requirement for a bank to enter through a joint venture with a domestic bank.
1.6. Permanent movement of people (w(1.6)=0,02)
§ No entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists.
§ Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 1 year.
§ Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 2 years.
§ Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 3 years.
§ Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 4 years.
§ Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay a period of 5 years or more.
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Appendix 1 (2/2)
List of potential restrictions to free trade of banking services (2)
2. Cross-border Trade (weight w(2)=0,20)
2.1. Raising funds by foreign banks (w(2.1)=0,10)
§ Banks are not permitted to raise funds in the domestic market./ Foreign banks are not permitted to have cross-border
deposits of Moroccan banks, corporations, and households
§ Banks are restricted from raising funds from domestic capital market. / Foreign banks are permitted to have cross-
border deposits of only some types of Moroccan residents or any type of Moroccan residents with specific ceiling
amount
§ Banks are restricted in accepting deposits from the public./ Foreign banks are permitted to have cross-border deposits of
Moroccan banks, corporations, and households with licenses
§ Banks can raise funds from any source with only prudential requirements. / Foreign banks are permitted to have cross-
border deposits of any type of Moroccan residents without restrictions
2.2. Lending funds by foreign banks (w(2.2)=0,10)
§ Banks are not permitted to lend to domestic clients./ Foreign banks are not permitted to have cross-border lending to
Moroccan banks, corporations, and households
§ Banks are restricted to a specified lending size or lending to government projects. / Foreign banks are permitted to have
cross-border lending to only some types of Moroccan residents or any type of Moroccan residents with specific ceiling
amount
§ Banks are restricted in providing certain services such as credit cards, leasing and consumer finance. / Foreign banks
are permitted to have cross-border lending to Moroccan banks, corporations, and households with licenses.
§ Banks are directed to lend to housing and small business.
§ Banks can lend to any source with only prudential restrictions. / Foreign banks are permitted to have cross-border
lending to any type of Moroccan residents without restrictions.
3. Other Restrictions
3.1. Other business of banks -insurance and securities (w(3.1)=0,10)
§ Banks can only provide banking services.
§ Banks can provide banking services plus one other line of business -insurance or security services.
§ Banks have no restrictions on conducting other lines of business.
3.2. Expanding the number of banking outlets (w(3.2)=0,05)
§ One banking outlet with no new banking outlet permitted.
§ Number of banking outlets is limited in number and location.
§ Expansion of banking outlets is subject to non-prudential regulatory approval.
§ No restrictions on banks expanding operations.
3.3. Composition of the board of directors (w(3.3)=0,02)
§ The score is inversely proportional to the percentage of the board that can comprise foreigners.
3.4. Temporary movement of people (w(3.4)=0,01)
§ No temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists.
§ Temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists up to 30 days.
§ Temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists up to 60 days.
§ Temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists up to 90 days.
§ Temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists over 90 days
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Appendix 2
Regulatory framework of Banking Services in Morocco (1)
1. Entry into Banking (1) Answers
What body/agency grants commercial banking licenses? The Minister of Finance
Is there more than one body/agency that grants licenses to banks? No
Is more than one license required (e.g., one for each banking activity, such as
commercial banking, securities operations, insurance, etc.)?
No
How many commercial banks were there at year-end 2004 15
What is the minimum capital entry requirement? (in US$ and/or domestic currency,
state which)
MAD 100.000.000
Is this minimum capital entry requirement the same for a foreign branch and
subsidiary?
Yes
Is it legally required that applicants submit information on the source of funds to be
used as capital?
Yes
Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory
authorities?
Yes
Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets
other than cash or government securities?
Yes
Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? No
Which of the following are legally required to be submitted before issuance of the
banking license?
Draft by-laws? Yes
Intended organization chart? Yes
Financial projections for first three years? Yes
Financial information on main potential shareholders? Yes
Background/experience of future directors? Yes
Background/experience of future managers? Yes
Sources of funds to be disbursed in the capitalization of new bank? Yes
Market differentiation intended for the new bank? Yes
In the past five years, how many applications for commercial banking licenses have been
received from domestic entities?
1
How many of those applications have been denied? 0
Number of applications from foreign entities to enter through the
acquisition of domestic bank?
Received 413
Denied 0
Number of applications from foreign entities to enter through new,
capitalized subsidiary?
Received 0
Denied 0
Number of applications from foreign entities to enter through
opening a branch?
Received 0
Denied 0
Number of applications from foreign entities to enter through some
other means?
Received 4
Denied 0
Are foreign entities prohibited from entering through
Acquisition Not prohibited
Subsidiary Not prohibited
Branch Not prohibited
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Regulatory framework of Banking Services in Morocco (2)
2. Ownership Answers
Is there a maximum percentage of bank capital that can be owned by a single owner? No
Can related parties own capital in a bank?? Yes
If yes, what are the maximum percentages associated with the total ownership by a related
party group (e.g., family, business associates, etc.)?
None
Can non-financial firms own shares in commercial banks? Permitted
Can non-bank financial firms (e.g. insurance companies, finance companies, etc.) own
commercial banks?
Permitted
3. Capital Answer
What is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement? 8%
Is this ratio risk weighted in line with the Basle guidelines? Yes
Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of an individual bank's credit risk? No
Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? No
What is the actual risk-adjusted capital ratio in banks as of year-end 2001, using the 1988
Basle Accord definitions?
12,60%
What is the actual capital ratio (i.e., not risk-adjusted) of banks as of year-end 2001? 7,50%
Is subordinated debt allowable as part of capital? Yes
Is subordinated debt required as part of capital? No
What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? 35%
What fraction of the banking system's assets is in banks that are:
50% or more government owned as of year-end 2001? 35%
50% or more foreign owned as of year-end 2001? 21%
Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the following are deducted from
the book value of capital?
Market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? Yes
Unrealized losses in securities portfolios? Yes
Unrealized foreign exchange losses? Yes
4. Activities Answer
Securities Permitted
Insurance Permitted
Real Estate Restricted
Bank Owning Non-financial Firms Restricted
13 It is about demand to increase their parts of capital to assure(insure) the control of the Moroccan banks.
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Regulatory framework of Banking Services in Morocco (3)
5. External Auditing Requirements Answer
Is an external audit a compulsory obligation for banks? Yes
Are specific requirements for the extent or nature of the audit spelled out? Yes
Are auditors licensed or certified? Yes
Do supervisors get a copy of the auditor's report? Yes
Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss
their report without the approval of the bank?
Yes
Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any
presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or
insider abuse?
Yes
Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? No; Bank Al-Maghrib can send
one warning to every listener who
does not release his mission with
the competence and the diligence
required or failed in its
commitments.
Bank Al-Maghrib can remove
him(her) the approval if he does
not take into account this warning.
Has legal action been taken against an auditor in the last 5 years? No
6. Internal Management/Organizational Requirements Answer
Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational
structure?
Yes
Has this power been utilized in the last 5 years? No
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Regulatory framework of Banking Services in Morocco (4)
7. Liquidity & Diversification Requirements Answer
Are there explicit, verifiable, and quantifiable guidelines regarding asset
diversification? (for example, are banks required to have some minimum diversification
of loans among sectors, or are their sectoral concentration limits)?
No
Are banks prohibited from making loans abroad? No; they can extend them after
preliminary agreement of proper
authorities.
Are banks required to hold either liquidity reserves or any deposits at the Central Bank? Yes
If so, what are these requirements? 14%
Do these reserves earn any interest? Yes
What interest is paid on these reserves? 0,50%
Are banks allowed to hold reserves in foreign denominated currencies or other foreign
denominated instruments?
Yes
If yes, please state the ratio Max ratio (net position/ net
capital and reserves) of 10% in
each currency and maximum ratio
of 20% for all currencies
Are banks required to hold reserves in foreign denominated currencies or other foreign
denominated instruments?
No
If yes, please state the ratio
What percent of the commercial banking system’s assets is foreign-currency
denominated?
4%
What percent of the commercial banking system’s liabilities is foreign-currency
denominated?
5%
What percent of the commercial banking system’s assets is in central government
bonds?
20,60%
What percent of the commercial banking system’s assets is funded with deposits? 73%
What percent of the commercial banking system’s assets is funded with insured
deposits?
73%
30
Regulatory framework of Banking Services in Morocco (5)
Depositor (Savings) Protection Schemes Answer
Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system? If yes: Yes
Is it funded by (check one) : the government, the banks, or both ? The banks
How insurance premia collected Regularly (ex ante)
Do deposit insurance fees charged to banks vary based on some assessment of risk? No
If pre-funded, what is the ratio of accumulated funds to total bank assets? 0,80%
What is the deposit insurance limit per account? MAD 50.000
Is there a limit per person? Yes
If yes, what is that limit (in domestic currency)? MAD 50.000
Is there formal co-insurance under which depositors are only insured for some percentage
of their deposits, either absolutely or above some floor and/or up to some limit?
Yes
Does the deposit insurance scheme also cover foreign currency deposits? Yes
Are inter-bank deposits covered? No
Does the deposit insurance authority make the decision to intervene a bank? No
If no, who does? The Central Bank and The
Ministry of Finance
Does the deposit insurance authority have the legal power to cancel or revoke deposit
insurance for any participating bank?
No
As a share of total assets, what is the value of large denominated debt liabilities of banks-
subordinated debt, bonds, etc.-that are definitely not covered by any explicit or implicit
savings protection scheme?
6%
As part of failure resolution, how many banks closed or merged in the last 5 years? 1; It is about a fusion-
absorption.
Were depositors wholly compensated (to the extent of legal protection) the last time a
bank failed?
Never happened
On average, how long does it take to pay depositors in full? Never happened
What was the longest that depositors had to wait in the last 5 years? Never happened
Were any deposits not explicitly covered by deposit insurance at the time of the failure
compensated when the bank failed (excluding funds later paid out in liquidation
procedures)?
Never happened
Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action against bank directors or other
bank officials?
No
Has the deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken legal action against bank directors or
other bank officials?
No
Are non-residents treated differently than residents with respect to deposit insurance
scheme coverage?
No
Who manages the insurance fund? Is it managed: (a) solely by the private sector No
(b) jointly by private-public
officials
No
(c) solely by public sector Yes
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9. Provisioning Requirements Answer
Is there a formal definition of a "non-performing loan”? Yes
The primary system for loan classification is based on which criterion? The number of days a loan is in
arrears
After how many days is a loan in arrears classified as:
Sub-standard? 90 days; Pre-doubtful debts
Doubtful? 180 days bad debts
Loss? 360 days compromised debts
What is the minimum provisioning required as loans become:
Sub-standard? 20%
Doubtful? 50%
Loss? 100%
If a customer has multiple loans and one loan is classified as non-performing, are
the other loans automatically classified as non-performing?
Yes; When the loan is classified in the
category of the compromised debts
What is the tax deductibility of provisions? Specific provisions can be deducted;
This deduction is not automatic.
